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Abstract: In this paper I attempt a reading of Heidegger’s interpretations of St. 
Paul’s Epistles in light of the distinction between Eastern and Western thought. 
To this end, I suggest that Heidegger’s recourse to the Paulinic texts represents 
his endeavor to gain access to the original structures of life by circumventing 
the metaphysical framework of Greek (Plato’s and Aristotle’s) thought. Thus, I 
argue that by doing this, Heidegger actually approaches the Eastern way of 
thinking, i.e. a non-metaphysical alternative. In order to better understand what 
defines Eastern thought, I discuss in some detail Zizioulas’s interpretations of 
temporality in Eastern Christianity. Along the lines of this different 
understanding of temporality, the proximity of Heideggerian thought can be 
seen. Finally, I show that the importance of my argument lies in that it can open 
a possible research path for what Heidegger in his latter works calls “the other 
beginning.” 
Keywords: Martin Heidegger, Christianity, Eucharist, performativity, 
metaphysics, the other beginning  
 
1. Introduction 
One of the most powerful traits of Martin Heidegger’s latter thought can be 
described as the desire to overcome metaphysics (Überwindung der Metaphysik). 
However this is not to be understood in the same way as, for example, Carnap’s 
“elimination of metaphysics.” The purpose of the Überwindung is rather a 
positive one, consisting in the pursuit of the “other beginning” (der andere 
Anfang) of thought. It is of utmost importance to note that we are not speaking 
about a “new” beginning, i.e. a break with the tradition and some sort of starting 
all over again from scratch. Moreover, between the classical metaphysical frame 
and the “other beginning” one cannot presume a relation of opposition. For the 
latter Heidegger, the paths that thinking takes do not go against or contradict 
each other; they rather complete themselves by offering thinking its full range 
and richness.  
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Does all this belong exclusively to the thinking of the so-called Heidegger II? 
If we judge by the textual occurrences of these specific termini, then the answer 
is without a doubt affirmative. However, if we question this from a wider point of 
view, things could become problematic. First, it is not at all clear that Heidegger’s 
Kehre – m which took place around the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 
1930s – means a repudiation of some sort of his earlier work. Second, Heidegger 
himself agreed with Richardson’s distinction between a “Heidegger I” and a 
“Heidegger II” under the explicit proviso that “only by way of what [Heidegger] I 
has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But 
the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained in 
[Heidegger] II” (Heidegger 2003, XXII). This “double implication” of Heidegger I 
and Heidegger II will constitute, in what follows, the main assumption of this 
paper. More precisely, the entire argument of my paper presupposes that, in 
order to better understand Heidegger II, one must first read Heidegger I, but in 
doing this, one should not neglect hearing possible “echoes” of that which in the 
chronological order of Heidegger’s complete works is yet to come. 
This paper focuses in fact on texts that constitute the so-called early 
period of Heideggerian thought, i.e. the first Freiburg courses. At the same time, 
the main hermeneutical hypothesis I develop is to a significant extent informed 
by elements to be found in latter Heideggerian thought, more precisely by those 
mentioned above: overcoming of metaphysics and the other beginning. In the 
center of my hermeneutical endeavor stands Heidegger’s course Introduction to 
the Phenomenology of Religion (Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion, 
volume 60 of Heidegger’s complete works), delivered in the winter semester of 
1920–21. My intention is not to offer a complete reconstruction of Heidegger’s 
account of the religious life, but rather to read his interpretations of the Pauline 
epistles from the viewpoint of a distinction regarding European thought, namely, 
the distinction between Eastern and Western thought – a distinction that is 
somewhat alien to Heidegger himself.  
Although this separation does not appear per se in Heidegger’s early work, 
I argue that such a reading can nevertheless be worthwhile. First, as I attempt to 
show, it can contribute to a wider understanding and contextualization of 
Heidegger’s thought. Second, in the long run, it can prevent the further 
development of some already emerging misunderstandings of Heidegger’s 
implicit relation regarding East and West. This type of misunderstanding can 
even be dangerous, in that it can lead to justifying more or less sound ideological, 
economic, or political claims starting from Heidegger’s philosophy. However, in 
this paper I deal only with the first aspect, considering this one further only as a 
token of the importance of understanding Heidegger’s connection with the (also 
political) distinction between East and West.  
In the first part of my paper, I sketch the relevant aspects of Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the Pauline letters. I also argue that Heidegger’s interest in 
primary Christianity can be seen as an attempt to find an alternative access to 
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the basic structures of life, other than that offered by Greek metaphysical 
thought. In short, I argue that, already in these lectures, the overcoming of 
metaphysics is at work. In the second part, I expand my argument by showing 
that this alternative to metaphysical thought took Heidegger in the proximity of 
what we call Eastern tradition. To this end, I take up a series of accounts 
concerning Patristic and Orthodox literature, and also Zizioulas’s description of 
Eastern Christianity’s understanding of time in the Holy Liturgy. Moreover, the 
distinction between Eastern and Western thought will also become clearer 
throughout this endeavor. In the third and last part, I attempt to show that the 
common ground of Heideggerian and Eastern thought can be expanded towards 
a discussion about what we could call the performativity of discourse. Following 
the extensive considerations in Antonio Cimino’s book Phänomenologie und 
Vollzug on the performativity of phenomenology, I intend to show that 
understanding it in the horizon of Eastern thought can shed more light on 
something that might be later called the other beginning.  
2. Theory and Scholasticism. The Context of Heidegger’s Interpretation of 
Pauline Epistles 
Let us begin with a short overview of Heidegger’s aims in his first lectures after 
the First World War. Heidegger’s entire thinking path between 1919 and 1923 
can be viewed as a laborious battle with theory, theorization and objectification. 
This is explicitly taken up in his dispute with the Neo-Kantian School (Natorp, 
Rickert, Windelband) concerning the problem of value. Heidegger’s view is that 
the source and starting point of philosophical (phenomenological) thought 
should be exclusively lived experience, and not a derived attitude such as the 
theoretical one. That is, our usual dealings, our day to day behavior in our world, 
the way in which we understand things as valuable in the context of our dealings 
with them, the way in which we meet the other in our daily trade within the 
frames of the with-world (Mitwelt) – all these should be the spring of 
philosophical knowledge.  
Still, how is it that the main attitude of our cultural tradition is the 
theoretical one? From Heidegger’s considerations – which stretch over more 
than one lecture – we can see that he is already beginning to form his thesis 
about metaphysics as the product of theoretical thought. Heidegger finds the 
origins of this attitude not in some mistaken philosophical view or agenda, but 
rather in a basic tendency of life itself. At the same time, however, he shows that 
the Greeks, mainly Plato and Aristotle, were dominated by this tendency and 
thus determined the course of the history of Western metaphysics as theory. 
Again, this is not to say that Plato and Aristotle were wrong, or that all they did 
was metaphysics, but that some basic traits of their thought, of vital importance 
for the history of philosophy, can be traced back to the derived attitude of 
theorizing.  
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Now, if philosophy is determined by a derivative attitude, and its access to 
the original structures of life is to a significant extent banned, how are we then to 
proceed? Besides Heidegger’s criticism of theory, he develops at the same time 
something that could save phenomenology from falling prey to theoretical 
influences. In his scarce methodological considerations, Heidegger talks about 
the so-called formal indication. This should be the way in which 
phenomenological discourse proceeds, radically different from the classical one, 
i.e. without objectification or theorization. How is this “methodological principle” 
to be understood? Attempting to answer this question we arrive in the proximity 
of the lecture concerning the phenomenology of religious life. In this course, 
Heidegger opened his considerations with extensive remarks concerning formal 
indication, and only later did he arrive to the explication of concrete religious 
phenomena starting from the epistles of St Paul.  
The fact that the most extensive discussion about formal indication is to be 
found in the beginning of a series of lectures concerning the phenomenology of 
religious life is of great importance. By developing the formal-indicative 
methodology of phenomenological discourse, Heidegger brings to light an 
alternative to metaphysics. Reading the history of philosophy in a formal-
indicative manner would mean to be aware of the specific attitude at work in it, 
which would be the theoretical one, for the most part. Moreover, it would also 
mean becoming aware of one’s own attitude towards matters at hand, and 
engaging in a performative unfolding of what is thought. That means taking on 
your own the task of thinking, following and reenacting (vollziehen) the thought 
that is disclosed in the philosophical text. More precisely, this task presupposes 
that there is something like a basic life experience from which thought emerged, 
and toward which discourse indicates by its formal-indicative termini.  
This can now be better understood in connection with the phenomenology 
of religious life because, as we shall see, the specific attitude of primary 
Christianity is one that resists theorization, and the way in which the letters 
function is different from the simple communication or sharing of an abstract, 
theoretical argument. My thesis is that by performing a formal-indicative reading 
of St Paul’s epistles, Heidegger is led precisely towards seeing “formal indication” 
at work. This is not at all a vicious circularity; it is rather an expression of the fact 
that formal indication is not something like an exterior methodological part to 
some system of phenomenology. In other words, it is an excellent example of the 
hermeneutical circle: At the “core” of formal indication lies the idea that it is not 
something already determined, but that it is of a processual nature, determining 
itself again and again (as “method”) as well as its termini, starting from and 
returning to that basic life experience that the text (in our case the epistles) 
allows to be seen. 
Heidegger’s discontent with theoretical thought is also to be seen in his 
dispute with the theology and philosophy of religion. The specifics of this dispute 
are relevant to our main topic because they reveal a similarity with Eastern 
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thought: the necessity of an underlying basic experience as source of discourse. 
Precisely this focus on the basic lived experience is what constitutes in my view 
the early Heidegger’s attempt of overcoming metaphysics. In the course that 
preceded Introduction…, Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression 
(Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks, volume 59 of Heidegger’s 
complete works), Heidegger stresses the necessity of a confrontation with Greek 
philosophy in order to gain access to the authentic understanding of Christian 
theology:  
There is the necessity of a fundamental confrontation with Greek philosophy 
and its disfiguration of Christian existence. The true idea of Christian 
philosophy; Christian not a label for a bad and epigonal Greek one. The way to a 
primordial Christian – Greek-free [griechentumfreien] – theology (Heidegger 
2010, 72).  
The deformations that Greek thought is guilty of, in Heidegger’s view, have to do 
with the fact that Greek thought determined the specific systematic way of 
understanding the soul, the faith, and other religious phenomena by 
objectification. According to Capelle, this is precisely what Heidegger thinks it’s 
the case with the system of Catholicism: 
[…] Catholicism excludes an original and authentic religious experience not 
mediated by the philosophical and dogmatic edifice. This predominance of the 
theoretical in Catholic tradition originates, after Heidegger, in Medieval 
Scholastic (itself heir of the Aristotelian transfer of the metaphysics of being 
over the categories of sciences of nature) which, in its turn, gravely endangered, 
in the bosom of the Medieval Christian world, the immediacy of religious life 
(Capelle 1998, 166). 
It must be noted that Capelle develops this reading in discussing the notes 
Heidegger made for a projected lecture series between June and October 1918 
on the medieval mystic. Although the lectures were never delivered in front of an 
audience, Capelle stresses their importance in showing Heidegger’s own 
distancing from the Catholic Church. The reasons for this can also be found, 
although in a shorter and unclear form, in Heidegger’s letter to Engelbert Krebs. 
In short, it is clear that Heidegger, in the period following the First World War, 
after returning from the war front, grew more and more aware of the 
inauthenticity of theoretical, systematic approaches that were prevalent in 
Catholic oriented philosophy of religion and even inside the Catholic Church. 
In the lectures from 1919 and until his departure from Freiburg, 
Heidegger developed the idea of phenomenology in a tight connection with the 
task of an authentic consideration of religion and its basic life structures. In 
doing this, besides developing tools like “destruction,” or the formal indication, 
Heidegger brings to light from a new perspective one of the main themes of his 
first magnum opus, Being and Time, namely historicity: 
 [o]ne of the most meaningful, founding elements of meaning in religious 
experience is the historical. However, that which gives the specifically religious 
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meaning is already found in experience. The religious world of experience is 
centralized in its originality – not in its theoretical-theological separateness – 
into one great unique historical form (personally affecting fullness of life). The 
constitutive character of the concepts of revelation and tradition in the essence 
of religion is connected to this (Heidegger 2004, 244).  
Or, historicity constitutes one of the basic concepts for the understanding 
of the overcoming of metaphysics, which is developed in the writings of later 
Heidegger in the wide frames of the history of being.  
3. Eastern and Western Thought in Their Essential Connection with 
Christianity 
In this section I develop the argument that Heidegger’s recourse to the Pauline 
epistles as an attempt to overcome metaphysical thought brings him in the 
proximity of what could be called Eastern thought. The importance of this 
argument can be stressed in a twofold manner: First, it can be seen as a 
hypocritical gesture, weakening the rather harsh distinction between East and 
West. Heidegger, a Western thinker, schooled in the scholastic-metaphysical 
tradition of Catholicism, becomes aware of his own cultural determinations and 
engages on a thinking path which, stemming from the core of Western thought, 
leads him in the vicinity of Eastern thought. In my opinion, this can be 
understood as a clue for the inner connection between what may seem at first to 
be just terms of a radical antagonism. Second, following closely the previous 
statements, my argument can bring more clarity to some contemporary debates 
concerning the often problematic and antagonistic relation between East and 
West. This clarification can offer a better identification of the ideological traits 
that permeate contemporary discourse and vitiate the dialogue.  
So far, it can be seen that the link between Heidegger and Eastern thought 
is primary Christianity, i.e. as it expresses itself in St. Paul’s epistles. However, in 
order to fully clarify this statement, one ought to show the connection between 
Eastern thought (Orthodox Church) and primary Christianity. By doing this, we 
also gain a better understanding of that which until now remained to some 
extent unclear: Eastern thought.  
3.1. The Meaning of the East: Theology and the Experience of Theosis 
What is Eastern thought and how does it relate to primary Christianity? The 
straightforward answer identifies Eastern thought by referring to what is known 
as the Schism of 1054 or the East-West Schism between the Byzantine and the 
Roman Church. The institutional and dogmatic disputes, as well as the history of 
the schism, are widely known and studied. Therefore, we will not dwell further 
on this aspect. More relevant to the task at hand is another kind of answer, which 
goes beyond institutions and dogmatic quarrels, and which offers an account of 
the peculiar traits and genealogy of the basic structures and ideas that constitute 
the so-called Eastern thought paradigm. Moreover, this second answer avoids 
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assuming an opposition from the start, i.e. a sort of negativity or conflict through 
which and in which Eastern thought would be understood.  
Eastern thought can be seen as originating from the early writings of the 
Cappadocian Fathers of the Church and remaining close to its origin: primary 
Christianity. The closeness to primary Christianity is clear in the writings of the 
Holy Fathers, namely in their insistence on the inseparability of teaching 
(theology) and life:  
One of the basic concerns of the Orthodox Church, as well as of primary 
Christianity, is that of not allowing, on the one hand theology (as teaching of the 
Church) and on the other hand the Christian’s life to move in different 
directions (Larentzakis 2003, 107).  
What Larentzakis stresses here is the positive formulation of what Heidegger, as 
we previously saw, criticizes: the theoretical approach. Keeping together life and 
teaching (theology) means nothing else than resisting theorization. As 
Larentzakis further argues in his work Theology and Life in the Orthodox Church:  
Theology refers directly to Christian life […], and must not transform itself into 
rational-philosophical, theoretical-cognitive speculation, detached from 
concrete life and perceived as an alien body in Church’s organism, and, on this 
ground, rejected (Larentzakis 2003, 107).  
We observe the same notes that constitute Heidegger’s leitmotif. Concrete life 
means, in this context, factical, day by day life, and not the special moments of 
one’s life, e.g. Sunday in Church. By following Meyendorff, Larentzakis further 
explains the Christian’s life in its connection with the dogmata of the Church by 
showing that  
the duty of the Christian is not just the reading of Christ’s Gospel or the simple 
knowledge of dogmata, but the living of one’s life unto Christ under the 
guidance of the Holy Spirit (Larentzakis 2003, 108). 
In Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pauline epistles, the problem of dogma 
is explicitly taken up in connection with the so-called context of enactment 
(Vollzugszusammenhang). Here, Heidegger stresses the lack of a theoretically or 
dogmatically colored content, and gives the following explanation:  
The dogma as detached content of doctrine in an objective, epistemological 
emphasis could never have been guiding for Christian religiosity. On the 
contrary, the genesis of dogma can only be understood from out of the 
enactment of Christian life experience (Heidegger 2004, 79).  
How does dogma come to be? Larentzakis explains this by showing that, in the 
beginnings of the Christian communities, their new way of life was constantly 
being endangered by different kinds of heresy. This is why the Church had to 
respond with an “official” doctrine,  
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[…] to show the Christians in what to believe and how to live. […] Thus 
dogmatizations are concrete actions of the Church in a certain time and in a 
certain and concrete historical and cultural context (Larentzakis 2003, 109). 
Following the role of the dogma in Eastern thought leads us to another key 
point of proximity between Orthodox Church, primary Christianity, and 
Heidegger’s interpretations, namely the role of experience (Erlebnis) and its 
connection with discourse. If, as we have seen, dogmatization represents an 
action that is asked for in a certain context, what kind of truth does it hold? 
Larentzakis mentions that at stake here is the divine truth, conserving at the 
same time the “human” character of the expression. This amounts to a 
weakening of the power of words, and to an indication of something that 
remains behind the text as it is, i.e. to a certain kind of experience. Speaking about 
the function of words and language as it is understood in Patristic literature, 
Romanides shows what is the origin, the inspiration of the holy texts of Christian 
tradition: 
And when and if he will reach theosis, then he will know from the experience of 
theosis itself what the words signify and the meanings he encounters in the 
Holy Scripture. […] words and meanings used in the Holy Scripture by the ones 
who are deified and wrote the Holy Scripture, as well as the words and 
meanings used in the writings of the Holy Fathers of the Church and of the 
Saints are inspired by God. That means that each of them either had the 
experience of illumination, either of theosis, and they wrote what they wrote on 
its ground (Romanides 2011, 104).  
It is thus not a revealed language, but an experience. Accordingly, a 
theologian is no longer like a scientist, an expert in Biblical texts, ancient 
languages, and so forth. He is someone who in speaking relates constantly to a 
lived experience. Moreover, Romanides quotes St. Gregory the Theologian on the 
forbiddance of theologizing by those who are not at least illuminated: 
Not to every one, my friends, does it belong to philosophize about God; not to 
every one; the Subject is not so cheap and low; and I will add, not before every 
audience, nor at all times, nor on all points; but on certain occasions, and before 
certain persons, and within certain limits. Not to all men, because it is 
permitted only to those who have been examined, and are passed masters in 
meditation, and who have been previously purified in soul and body, or at the 
very least are being purified. For the impure to touch the pure is, we may safely 
say, not safe, just as it is unsafe to fix weak eyes upon the sun's rays. 
The access to the “thing itself” of the discourse is that which actually 
allows the discourse to be. Without the guiding basic experience it would not be 
safe. The danger stems from the fact that here we are no longer having to deal 
with a universal truth, obtainable by means of reason and rules of logic. However, 
as Heidegger also noted in other regards, it would be completely false to 
interpret St. Gregory’s forbiddance in terms of the irrational and illogical. More 
precisely, the danger, in my interpretation, is not that of irrationality, but that of 
falling into heresy. The weakness of the eyes upon the sun’s rays echoes, to some 
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extent, the Platonic situation of the one who exists in the cave. The difference, 
however, is that the light does not belong to something similar to an idea, and the 
weakness is not that of an untrained, constantly deceived intellect. This touch of 
the impure could “apotropaically” begin forging conceptual idols, 
representations, coining terms that would define God, etc. The impure touch 
could end up somewhere just South of heaven. 
Theology, thus, differs in the Eastern thought from its understanding in 
the West precisely by being essentially dependent on a basic experience of 
divinity. Still, this experience does not seem to say a lot about the life of 
Christians, since not every Christian is illuminated or deified. If the vital recourse 
to experience applies just to the special case of revelation, then it would mean 
that we are dealing with something entirely different than in Heidegger’s case. As 
we have discussed in the first part of this paper, Heidegger thinks of 
phenomenological discourse as always relating to a basic life experience, i.e. 
something that each and one of us can experience in facticity, not in an ultimate, 
rare experience.  
However, I argue that it is not the case that in this respect Heidegger 
cannot come to terms with Eastern thought. Cleansing, illumination, and theosis 
are, for the Orthodox Tradition, the ultimate goal. The entire Orthodox Tradition, 
as understood by the Holy Fathers, is a method of therapy, of leading the 
Christian on the way to spiritual health. This implies that the entire life is 
projected unto the horizon of theosis, and thus that the experience is a 
continuous one. One cannot speak about an experience of theosis without having 
had the experience of cleansing and illumination, i.e. of Christian life. The 
Orthodox “therapy”  
is not a simple transfer of knowledge from books, but a transfer and succession 
in experience, in the experience of illumination and in the experience of theosis 
(Romanidis 2011, 62).  
Knowing of God, as the ultimate goal of Christian life, begins, in the first place, 
with the acceptance (Annehmen) of tradition, which, in its turn, is nothing else 
than the knowing of God by those who experienced theosis. In short, the 
experience of theosis is based on an entire life process, and is meant to 
communicate through words the revealed truths in order for the other, in their 
turn, to be able to reach theosis. Tradition understood in this way has a 
pronounced character of enactment (Vollzug).  
3.2. Proclamation, History and Temporality: The Novelty of the Holy Eucharist 
Let us not forget that St. Paul himself is one of those “snatched up to the 
heavens,” who have experienced theosis and is now  
aware that his mission’s success, and his very salvation, are bound up with the 
faithfulness to the gospel that the Thessalonians will preserve till the parousia 
(Vattimo 2002, 129).  
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In this condensed expression of Heidegger’s view, Vattimo captures the relation 
of St. Paul with the Thessalonians and, at the same time, the relation with the 
basic event of Christian life: parousia.  
The problem of communication, as we have provisionally named it, is 
tackled by Heidegger in the interpretation of euaggélion, proclamation 
(Verkündigung). This particular phenomenon is to be further singled out from 
the context of which it is part of – calling, proclamation, doctrine, warning –, 
because, Heidegger argues,  
in it the immediate life-relation of the world of self of Paul to the surrounding 
world and to the communal world of the community is able to be 
comprehended. It is thus a central phenomenon (Heidegger 2011, 55–56).  
The life-relation is determined by the precise situation in which Paul writes the 
letter, as von Herrmann puts it:  
Paul experiences the Thessalonians in their ‘having become (genēthēnai) as his 
and the Lord’s followers, and by this he also experiences that the Thessalonians 
who follow him ‘have a knowledge of their having-become’ (von Herrmann 
2007, 25-26).  
This “having-become,” in Heidegger’s view, is nothing else than having 
already accepted the proclamation. This, in turn, means that the being of the 
Thessalonians is precisely this “having-become.” The “knowing“ of which Paul is 
aware is not of the sort of theoretical knowledge, rather it refers to the fact that 
their behavior in their factical lives has now changed, i.e. they have turned from 
the idols towards God.  
Here lies a special understanding of temporality, which Heidegger will 
latter identify as the authentic manner in which Christianity lives temporality. 
Namely, a non-sequential, intensional temporality. In this case, the 
Thessalonians hear from St. Paul what they in fact already know. Vattimo rejects 
the reading that would imply a sort of “textual“ knowledge of what St. Paul 
earlier said:  
To reduce egeneto to the recent memory of Paul’s preaching implies a literal 
reading that Paul himself refutes (and that we, as interpreters, cannot ignore), 
since his first preaching to the Thessalonians is the announcement of what they 
already are by virtue of Christ’s redemption (Vattimo 2002, 127).  
Thus, in the phenomenon of proclamation, the historicity of factical life as such 
appears: not in the sense that each proclamation is a lecture on history, but that 
the proclamation itself is accessible and is being enacted in the context of already 
having accepted the word of God. 
At the same time, and on the other hand, St. Paul also follows his calling, in 
that he proclaims the word of God to the Thessalonians and to the others. He 
becomes what he is only in that they steer their lives accordingly. Moreover, a 
particular meaning of theology, which is close to the Eastern one, surfaces here. 
The fact that they know about their becoming  
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is the starting point and the origin of theology. In the explication of this 
knowledge and its conceptual form of expression the sense of a theological 
conceptual formation arises. The déchesthai is characterized in its how as an en 
thlípsei (in despair). The acceptance consists in experiencing the anguish of life. 
A joy is bound up therewith, one which comes from the Holy Spirit and is 
incomprehensible to life (Heidegger 2011, 66).  
This is, in Heidegger’s view, the original, authentic source of theology, i.e. the 
context of Christian facticity. 
The central themes of the Eastern Church upon which we have come so far 
– experience, tradition, history, and temporality – can further be explained in their 
proximity with Heideggerian thought by following certain observations of 
Ioannis Zizioulas on the Divine Eucharist and its role in the life of Christians. I 
hope here to show that the way in which Heidegger understands the life of the 
primary Christianity comes very close to the one peculiar to Eastern thought.  
In the center of our argument lies the different understanding of 
temporality that defines the Eastern tradition of the Church:  
The Eucharist is not a repetition or continuation of the past, or just one event 
amongst others, but it is the penetration of the future into time. The Eucharist is 
entirely live, and utterly new; there is no element of the past about it (Zizioulas 
2008, 155).  
We are not presented here with a denial of the past. The character of being 
utterly new of the Eucharist is not something like the everyday novelty that in 
passing by catches one’s eye: a new gadget, a new car, a new commercial, etc. 
The new, in the context of the Eucharist, depends entirely on the intensity with 
which the event is lived, and on the authentic appropriation of an essential past. 
In other words, it is new insofar as it does not constitute a simple remembering 
of what has been, in a historical manner, utterly exterior; it is new because the 
present is understood as being at the same time past. This is why we could say, 
using Heidegger’s term from Being and Time, that we are dealing with an 
essential past, and not with a past understood merely in a chronological 
(Aristotelian) manner as that which no longer is. 
This temporality, I argue, is the same as that which Heidegger formally 
identifies as the one lived by primary Christianity: “Christian religiosity lives 
temporality” (Heidegger 2011, 73). It is a temporality, Heidegger continues, that 
cannot be encountered objectively, or determined by a certain concept of time, 
that lacks order (Ordnung) and demarcations (feste Stellen). 
‘Now is the judgment of the world’ (John 12.31). This ‘now’ of the Fourth Gospel 
refers to the Eucharist, in which all these events represent themselves 
immediately to us, without any gaps of history between them (Zizioulas 2008, 
155).  
What does the lack of history mean here? More precisely, the lacking of the 
historical gap? The so-called historical gap or gaps of history presuppose a 
sequential time, a continual flow of the nows. The distance between this now and 
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another, regardless of how small, constitutes such a gap or interval. The waiting 
as we understand it today is configured as a being situated in the interval: we are 
oriented toward a now, toward a moment that is on its way here, which will 
come. Being situated in this interval means the passing of time, and it is often 
attuned by boredom. The endless passing of consecutive moments determines 
the approaching of the future as well as the distancing of the past. The more 
something gets closer, the more real it seems to us, and the more something 
sinks into the mists of the past, the more unreal it becomes, as though it never 
existed; it is effaced by oblivion.  
Now, the lack of a historical gap does not mean simultaneity, as if every 
time the events would occur concomitantly. Rather, the absence of historical 
gaps shows the unmediated presence in the life of the Christian of something 
that in our everyday understanding can seem a simple historical fact, that took 
place long ago and of which, maybe, the believers are ought to be remembered 
from time to time. We are not dealing, thus, with a lack of history, better yet, with 
a privation of history, or with an ahistoricism, but with the outmost authentic 
retrieval and appropriation of history itself. History is no longer seen as 
something having to do with that which has happened and passed, but as 
something that in an essential manner determines our lives. It is in this way, 
precisely, that we can read Heidegger’s sentence: “The character of ‘having been’ 
arises, in a certain way, from the future” (Heidegger 1962, 373). In the context of 
the present interpretation, this means the same as “the penetration of the future 
into time.” The “Now” of which Apostle John spoke is a radically different one 
than Aristotle’s. The judgment of the world that takes place now, or the parusia 
that already took place, takes place, and will happen, are to be understood in the 
manner of intensional or kairological temporality. 
For Zizioulas, this understanding of time and Eucharist is specific to the 
Eastern tradition of Orthodoxy. In that which concerns the Western thought, he 
identifies, as Heidegger also did, its historicist tendency: the chronological 
understanding of time form the perspective of the subject:  
The whole force of the Western intellectual tradition attempts to separate 
history and eschatology and fit Christian doctrine into its historicist and 
immanent mentality. Either the end of times is a separate chapter that will take 
place ‘afterwards,’ or it is the charismatic experience of a select few, set apart 
from the historical community. However, the eschaton means the end of all 
separate, disconnected times, the reconnection and reconciliation of our 
separate histories and the arrival of their future and fulfilment (Zizioulas 2008, 
155). 
4. Performativity of Phenomenological Discourse and the Way Towards the 
Other Beginning. Concluding Remarks 
In this final section, let us return to the more general context of this paper, 
namely the overcoming of metaphysics, the other beginning, and the new 
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research direction into the performativity of phenomenological discourse. We 
set out to show that Heidegger’s interpretations of St Paul’s epistles represented 
the alternative to Greek metaphysical thought. Moreover, I tried to prove that in 
doing this, Heidegger’s way of thinking converges with the Eastern Orthodox one. 
This proximity became manifest in some of the common pillars of these two 
manners of thought: understanding of history, time, life, experience and 
discourse. 
However inciting this vicinity may be in itself, it remains of course still 
problematic and insufficiently elaborated and nuanced, the task stretching way 
beyond the scope of this paper. Still, although fundamentally incomplete, the 
present attempt could prove deficient if we were to resume ourselves to the 
simple observation of two ways of thought. What these final remarks thus 
puport  to show is how the possibility of philosophy stemming from primary 
Christianity (Eastern thought) is, in fact, a figure of the other beginning. 
Moreover, one of its essential traits is the so-called performativity.  
Performativity is a concept that has a significant carreer in the 20th 
century analytical philosophy. Following the publication of Heidegger’s early 
Freiburg Lectures, however, the idea of performativity entered, by means of the 
excellent contributions of Antonio Cimino, into the frames of phenomenology. 
Performativity, as it is presented in Cimino 2013, and as we will further 
understand it, would have never been of such great importance if it was not for 
Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity. As Cimino’s book proves it, the discussion 
about performativity in Heidegger’s works is complex. Still, I should try to sketch 
the basic ideas behind it that are also in direct connection with our previous 
analysis. 
Heidegger noted that the center of Christian life experience is the world of 
the self as a distinct feature of the Christian life. The original structure of the life-
world, developed in extenso in the course Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
(Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, volume 58 of Heidegger’s complete works) 
comprises the with-world (Mitwelt), surrounding world (Umwelt), and world of 
the self (Selbstwelt). Coextensive to this distinction, Heidegger also describes the 
threefold sense structure of factical life: content sense (Gehaltssinn), relational 
sense (Bezugssinn) and sense of enactment (Vollzugssinn). These formal 
divisions presented by Heidegger are not valuable in themselves, as coined 
terms. They are meant to help directing the phenomenological gaze toward that 
which is original (ursprünglich). Metaphysics, in this context, can be understood 
as being the fruit of a precise relational sense, namely the theoretical attitude, 
and a favoring of the content sense, the what (Was) of the considered object.  
According to this Heideggerian interpretation of the theoretical attitude, 
the self-world withdraws in focusing itself on the whatness of the object, on the 
content of experience, analyzing, ordering, etc. Thus the detached subject of 
modern metaphysics, in Heidegger’s view, is possible. Now, in saying that 
Christian life is centered in the self-world and that here we have to deal with an 
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“intensification of facticity,” Heidegger identifies pre-theoretical experience as 
the locus of original attitude and authentic thought, and institutes 
phenomenology, in its attempt to access this original sphere, as a performative 
science because “[t]o a thematic originality must also correspond a 
methodological originality” (Cimino 2013, 162). According to Cimino, 
performativity is to be understood under three further determinations: 1) as 
originality (Ursprünglichkeit), 2) validity (Echtheit), and 3) authenticity 
(Eigentlichkeit). All of these presuppose phenomenology as a way of life:  
The phenomenological life form is more original, as it is more performative, i.e. 
as it is more capable of expressing the performative dynamic of the factical life. 
(Cimino 2013, 163) 
Therefore, phenomenology as a performative discourse is no longer a 
theoretical description of phenomena. Its central impetus is the enactment of an 
original life experience. In other words, phenomenology becomes hermeneutics 
of facticity: interpreting the everyday life as a basic experience of life. This also 
means total involvement from the phenomenologist, assuming the first-person 
perspective. The performative discourse as discourse of the first-person is 
clearly connected with its centering in the self-world. The reenactment of the 
context of experience presupposes something like transposing (Sichversetzen) 
oneself into history, i.e. directing one’s attention towards the way in which (Wie) 
experience is enacted, being in the situation. In our present context, this would 
be the situation of the Christian. This situation Heidegger did not at all exhaust, 
as he did not offer a systematic overview of the Christian life; instead, he offered 
basic indications which allow the reader to gain as authentic an access as one can, 
i.e. knowing how to behave in relation to one’s own surrounding world, with-
world, and self-world. 
Heidegger’s interpretations of St. Paul’s epistles are indeed such 
performative endeavors. At the same time, they contribute to the development of 
the enactment-oriented phenomenological method itself. Its importance for 
philosophy can be seen from this observation of von Herrmann:  
And now comes the most important indication, that only out of this 
temporalizing contexts of enactment of Christian factical Life, ‘the meaning of 
the Being of God’ (117) can be philosophically determined (von Herrmann 2007, 
29).   
This is where the connection of performativity and the other beginning is 
to be found. Heidegger’s thesis concerning the medieval philosophy, but also 
scholastic and modern metaphysics, is that it can be called onto-theology. This 
means that each of them needs a concept of the transcendent God in order to 
function as a system, without having an authentic understanding of His being or 
at least understanding this as a problem. Not only does Heidegger identify this 
problem stretching throughout the history of philosophy, but in this lecture we 
find a certain indication of a path, which heads out from the basic everyday life 
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context of primary Christianity. On this path, the problem of the overcoming of 
metaphysics may indeed develop as the overcoming of onto-theology, avoiding 
the fusion of Greek and Christian thought that ultimately led, as Vattimo shows, 
to  
[…] a history in the course of which the authenticity of the Christian message 
has been misunderstood, and that runs parallel to the history of the 
metaphysical forgetting of Being (perhaps not so much parallel to as 
intertwined with it; by the same token, onto-theology is only another name for 
metaphysics) (Vattimo 2002,132). 
The other beginning could mean overcoming of theory, preserving the 
vitality of life and of thought, remodeling of discourse according to the 
desideration of performativity. All these would not entail going beyond ourselves, 
or jumping over our own shadow, but coming closer to our innermost 
possibilities as Europeans: understanding the original unity between the East 
and West, between life and theory. As I have tried to show, in the overcoming of 
metaphysics there is no talk of abandoning our heritage. Rather, we can now see 
that it offers the key to regain it by accessing the original life contexts from 
which it stems. Finally, our question could very well be one concerning the 
possibility of the other beginning: Can theory lead back into life, and not be just 
its opposite? 
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